Introduction
The Australian age pension represents the first pillar of Australia's pension system and is currently the major income source for most Australian retirees. The pension is non-contributory, funded through general tax revenues and means tested against pensioners' private resources, including labour earnings. The means test has been an important component of the age pension since its introduction more than a century ago. Importantly, means testing (and the flat rate pension payments) largely accounts for low cost pension expenditure, which is about 2.9 percent of GDP now, rising to 4 percent in 2050 (Australian Treasury, 2010 ). This policy is much less expensive than in most OECD countries, where expenditures allocated to retirement payouts average 9.5 percent of GDP across the member countries (OECD, 2013).
The Australian government has recently implemented several changes to the means testing of the pension, with aims to better target the payments to those in need and to encourage labour supply of older Australians. These changes include an increase in the taper rate (at which the pension is withdrawn) from 0.4 to 0.5 and an exemption of up to $6,500 of annual labour earnings from the means testing. 1 In this paper, we assess the implications of several hypothetical policy changes to the means testing of the age pension. The main motivation is to examine further increases in the taper rate to contain rising pension expenditures and higher exemptions of labour earnings from the means testing -as extensions of the 2009 age pension reform. As many countries do not have targeted public pensions (e.g., New Zealand), we also assess policy changes that relax the existing pension means test by reducing the taper. Specifically, we consider the following two sets of policy experiments: (i) adjustments of the pension taper from the current rate of 0.5 to zero, 0.25, 0.75 and one; and (ii) changes in labour earnings exemptions from the current exemption of up to $6,500 per year to 100 percent and 0 percent.
The main objective of this study is to explore the implications of these means testing policy changes for incentives of individuals to work and save, for macroeconomic aggregates and individual welfare. While it is well known that public pensions may discourage life-cycle labour supply and saving (as they act as a substitute for private income in retirement), the effects of the means testing on labour supply and saving are not as clear-cut. On the one hand, means tests generate high effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs), which have negative implications for labour supply and the saving behaviour of older people. On the other hand, means tests reduce public pensions, thus resulting in higher life-cycle labour supply and saving. In addition, means tested pensions allow for lower taxes on workers, providing households with further work incentives.
The paper also determines distributional welfare effects and draws out budgetary implications for the government. Understanding these effects will benefit not only to Australia but also to other ageing economies facing large public pension liabilities.
To undertake this analysis, we apply an extension of the overlapping generations (OLG) model developed for Australia by Kudrna and Woodland (2011a, b) , with a more detailed disaggregation of households into income quintiles and an updated calibration to recent Australian data. Our methodology has a range of features that make it particularly appropriate for the analysis of the means testing of public pensions (not just in the Australian context, but worldwide). First, the model employs life-cycle utility maximisation with endogenous retirement and a broader pension means test imposed on both assets income and labour earnings-allowing for a different means test treatment of the two sources of private in-come. This is in contrast with most studies that assumed exogenous retirement and thus assessed only assets and/or assets income under the means test-see, for example, Sefton et al. (2008) , Piggott (2009, 2012 ), Cho and Sane (2013) and Kitao (2014) . Second, we incorporate inter-and intragenerational heterogeneity among households into the model, which allows us to evaluate policy impacts upon different household types. Third, the model includes a detailed model-equivalent representation of Australia's age pension, superannuation and income tax policy settings and hence captures important interactions between household behaviour and these policy settings.
Another important contribution of our analysis to related literature, which has focused largely on the long term equilibrium effects (e.g., Maattanen and Poutvaara (2007) and Tran and Woodland, 2014) , is that we investigate the implications of policy changes upon impact, over the transition and in the long term. The transitional effects of means testing pensions are also analysed by Kudrna and Woodland (2011a) and Fehr and Uhde (2013, 2014) . In contrast to Kudrna and Woodland (2011a) who examined the hypothetical removal of the Australian pension means test, we concentrate on the policy changes that strengthen the means testing in order to contain government spending on the pension. Fehr and Uhde (2013, 2014) consider the means testing of only assets income, while one of the main objectives of our paper is to evaluate the effect of the means testing of income earned from employment on labour supply of older households. The rest of this article is organised as follows. The next section describes the overlapping generations model that we use for the policy simulations. Section 3 discusses the calibration of the model to the Australian economy and presents the benchmark solution for main life-cycle 2 The percentage changes in the brackets show the long run implications of the taper rate increased to one, relative to the benchmark with the current taper rate of 0.5.
profiles and macroeconomic aggregates. Section 4 reports on the simulation results for the examined policy changes in the pension taper rate and labour earnings exemptions. Section 5 is devoted to a sensitivity analysis of several modifications of the model. Section 6 offers some conclusions and policy recommendations.
Model description
The model builds on the general equilibrium OLG model developed for Australia by Kudrna and Woodland (2011a, b) , which is extended in this paper to include (i) a more detailed intragenerational heterogeneity based on income distribution data from Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2012a) and (ii) an updated calibration with a detailed representation of the age pension settings in 2012. It is a small open economy version of Auerbach and Kotlikoff's (1987) model that consists of household, production, government and foreign sectors.
The household sector is populated with 70 overlapping generations aged 21 to 90 years, with each generation consisting of five income types of households distinguished by their productivity and social welfare payments. Households face lifespan uncertainty described by survival probabilities and make optimal consumption/saving and leisure/labour supply choices to maximise their inter-temporal utility. Importantly, retirement from workforce is also endogenous and (similar to labour supply, consumption and savings) affected by the tax and retirement income policy settings. In terms of Australia's retirement income policy, the model incorporates essential features of the age pension and mandatory superannuation.
The production sector contains a large number of perfectly competitive firms. The firms demand capital and labour to produce a single all-purpose output good that can be consumed, invested in production capital or traded internationally. The government collects tax revenues from households and firms to pay for general government consumption and transfer payments to households. It is assumed that the government maintains a balanced budget by adjusting the progressive income tax schedule, as in Tran and Woodland (2014).
We employ a small open economy framework with an exogenous interest rate since that description best fits the Australian economy. Finally, equilibrium in the model requires labour, capital and goods markets to clear. That is, in every time period, (i) the demand for labour from perfectly competitive firms must equal the supply of labour from households; (ii) the value of the capital stock must equal domestic assets less foreign debt; and (iii) output is equal to the sum of private and public consumption, investment and trade balance.
Demographics
We 
subject to the per-period budget constraints written as 
where the annual utility,
, being discounted by the subjective discount factor, (β, and the unconditional survival probability, A denotes the stock of ordinary private assets held at the end of age a , and time t, which equals the assets at the beginning of the period, plus the sum of interest income, 
Retirement income policy
The Australian retirement income policy contains three pillars. The first is a mandatory, publicly-managed pillar represented by the age pension. The second is also mandatory, but is a privately-managed and fully-funded superannuation guarantee scheme. The third pillar includes other long term private savings such as voluntary superannuation. In the model, we consider the two publicly stipulated pillars-age pension and mandatory superannuation. The policy changes to the means testing that we examine involve the changes in (i) the income taper denoted by θ in (3) and (ii) labour earnings exemptions. In case of labour earnings exemptions, we consider two policy changes. The first change is to extend the exemptions to 100
percent. Under that policy change, the assessable income in (3) is altered to include only interest ear . The second policy change is to abolish the exemptions, with the assessable income altered to include both sources of private income in full, nings, ,
Firms and technology
The production sector assumes a large number of perfectly competitive firms that demand capital, t K ; labour, t L ; and investment, t I ; to maximise the present value of all future profits subject to the (per capita) capital accumulation equation:
.
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, where ψ is the adjustment cost coefficient and δ denotes the capital depreciation rate. The CES production function is
, with the productivity constant, κ , the capital intensity parameter, ε , and the elasticity of substitution in production, σ .
Solving the firm's maximisation problem yields the first-order necessary conditions and gives expressions for the equilibrium wage rate, t w ; interest rate, r ; and capital price, t q .
Government
The government is assumed to maintain a balanced budget, which can be expressed, in per capita terms, as
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where the per capita expenditures are government consumption, G, and social transfer payments, ST, which both are assumed to be constant, and the expenditure on the age pension, 
Market structure and equilibrium
The 
where t TB is the trade balance and 
Calibration and benchmark economy
The benchmark economy is assumed to be in a steady state equilibrium. We calibrate this benchmark to key Australian aggregates averaged over the five-year period ending in 2012, with the tax and pension policy settings and parameters of that year. This section reports on the model parameterisation and then presents a comparison of the benchmark solution with Australian data for some variables.
Parameterisation
The values of the main parameters used in the benchmark model and the sources are pro-vided in Table 1 . As shown, some of the parameters are taken from related literature, some exactly 7 The exogenous interest rate assumption is relaxed in Section 5.
match actual data and others are calibrated such that the benchmark solution yields outcomes consistent with observed data. 
Model parameters
We assume a stationary demographic environment with the age specific survival rates, a s ,taken from the 2010-12 life tables (ABS, 2013a) and the annual population growth rate of n = 0.018 is chosen to generate a realistic old-age dependency ratio of 0.22. The intra-generational shares, i ω , are equal to 0.2 for each income type, which is based on the quintiles used by ABS (2012a).
The values assigned to the utility and technology parameters are standard in related literature.
The calibrated utility parameters include the subjective discount factor, β, and the leisure preference parameter, α, that target the capital to output ratio (=3) and the average fraction of time spent working by those aged 25 to 60 years (=0.33), respectively. Most of the production function parameters are also calibrated to replicate other calibration targets, including the investment rate of 0.09 and the foreign debt to capital ratio of 19.5 percent. The wage rate, w, is normalised to one and the exogenous interest rate, r, is set to 5 percent.
The values of the age pension and superannuation parameters are those applicable in 2012. The consumption and corporation tax rates are set to their statutory rates of 10 percent and 30 percent, respectively. We assume no government debt and use an income tax function that approximates the 2011-12 progressive income tax schedule. We also make use of adjustment parameters to target the ratios of consumption and corporate tax revenues to GDP and the ratios of public consumption, pension expenditures and other social welfare to GDP.
Intragenerational heterogeneity
The five income types of households (i.e., income quintiles) differ by their exogenously given earnings ability, are assumed to be received by households in the lowest to fourth quintiles aged younger than 65 years ( a < 65) and are also derived from ABS (2012a), which provides the share of social welfare in gross total income for each income quintile. These government benefits (representing welfare payments such as family benefits and disability support pensions) allow us to match not only private income but also gross total income for each quintile.
Benchmark solution and performance
The benchmark solution is obtained by numerically solving the model for the initial steady state equilibrium, with the parameters and the policy settings specified above. We use the GAMS software and the Gauss-Seidel iterative method to solve for the initial steady state equilibrium as well as transition paths for the examined policy changes. The algorithm involves choosing initial guesses for some variables and then updating them by iterating between the production, household and government sectors until convergence (see Kudrna and Woodland (2011a) for exact computational steps).
Life-cycle profiles
The benchmark solution for life-cycle profiles of consumption, labour supply, total assets, labour earnings, total income and age pension payments is depicted by Figure 1 . The life-cycle profiles of consumption expenditures, labour supply and labour earnings for each income quintile exhibit the standard hump-shape, rising at early ages and then declining. The shapes of these profiles reflect the assumed hump-shaped productivity profile and the increasing mortality risk, while the age profile of total assets reflects the saving decision along with the assumed zero initial and terminal asset holdings by households. Figure 1 also shows sudden reductions in consumption, labour supply and labour earnings for some income quintiles at older ages, which are due to the retirement income policy. First, the superannuation savings are illiquid until age 60, at which each quintile is assumed to receive a lump sum payout. Subsequently, the payout has an income effect on labour supply, with the drop in labour supply being particularly large for lower income types. 8 Second, households at age 65 become eligible for the age pension that is means tested. The graph with the age profiles of pension payments shows that the lowest quintile gets full age pension from age 65 onwards. The second and third quintiles receive part age pension at age 65, while households in the highest quintile do not receive any pension until age 72. The two lowest quintiles reduce their working hours at age 65 as a result of the income effect of the pension payment. The sudden drop in labour supply of the third quintile is due predominantly to the effective means testing with the preferential treatment of labour earnings. In particular, households in the third quintile at early age pension ages reduce their working hours to earn exactly $6,500 per year that is not means tested. The same labour supply behaviour is shown for the fourth quintile at age 67. 9 The behavioural effects of the age pension on the highest income quintile are insignificant because the pension is of less importance to them in comparison with lower quintiles.
Data comparison
We now compare some of the life-cycle profiles and the main macroeconomic The comparison reveals similar shapes as well as levels of the model-generated and data-based profiles for the three selected household variables. 9 Older households in the fourth quintile work less than households of the same ages in the third quintile because they are assumed to earn a higher effective wage. of which are used as the calibration targets. 10 In more detail, we calculate adjustment factors for the pension expenditures, the consumption tax (GST) revenue, the corporation tax revenue and other social transfers to match exactly the targeted ratio of each indicator to GDP. 11 The model overestimates the tax revenues from 
Policy simulations and analysis
We now use the model described and calibrated in the previous sections to simulate hypothetical policy changes in (i) the taper rate to zero, 0.25, 0.75 and one; and (ii) labour earnings exemptions to 100 percent and 0 percent. Each of the hypothetical policy changes is assumed to be implemented in 2012. 12 The associations between the age pension and the two sources of private income in the benchmark setting and under the selected hypothetical reforms are depicted by Figure 3 . As shown, setting the taper to zero represents a shift to the universal pension (or demogrant) that is paid to all individuals of the age pension age regardless of their assets income and/or labour earnings. In contrast, setting the taper to one represents a strict income test policy that almost halves the maximum private incomes of pensioners to qualify for any pension. As for the two changes in labour earnings exemptions, the figure only shows the association between the age pension and labour earnings because the unchanged taper of 0.5 implies the same age pension schedule for assets income as in the benchmark. In the case of 100 percent labour earnings exemptions, only the assets income is means tested, while the 0 percent earnings exemption policy treats the two sources of private income in the same way as in the benchmark for assets income. 12 Notice that our analysis abstracts from any other policy changes that may affect pension payments and total government spending on the age pension, including the legislated increases in the pension access age from 65 to 67 and in the superannuation guarantee rate from 9 percent to 12 percent of gross wages that are to be phased in gradually in the near future. The changes in the age pension schedule reported in Figure 3 are expected to have direct effects upon life-cycle behaviour of households and also indirect or general equilibrium effects due predominantly to the assumed, budget-equilibrating adjustments in the income tax schedule (i.e., proportional changes to average/marginal income tax rates). In this section, we present and discuss disaggregate behavioural effects, as well as the macroeconomic and welfare implications.
We start with long run steady state implications and then proceed to short term and transitional implications of the investigated policy changes.
Long run implications
The long run steady state implications apply if we assume that there has been sufficient time for the economy to adjust completely to the new policy settings. In this case, households of different generations, but of the same income type, face exactly the same economic environments (though at different calendar times) and so behave in exactly the same way. Below we discuss the long run implications separately for the taper rate changes and the change in labour earnings exemptions.
Taper rate changes
The long run effects of the taper rate changes on average life-cycle labour supply, consumption and total assets are presented in Figure 4 . For ease of exposition, each graph compares the benchmark steady state profile, which is averaged across five income types of households, only with the average profiles obtained from the two extreme changes in the taper to zero (i.e., universal pension) and to one (i.e., strict means test).
FIGURE 4: The Long Run Steady State Effects of Taper Rate Changes on Average Life Cycle

Similarly to Kumru and Piggott (2009) and Fehr and Uhde (2014), the life cycle results indicate
that the high taper rate policy leads to less consumption smoothing, but larger assets accumulations for most of the life cycle with steeper assets withdrawals at older ages.
Furthermore, as the increased taper lowers average pension payments to elderly households, the associated disincentive to work declines, partly explaining increased labour supply of young and middle age cohorts (Figure 4a ). The indirect effect of reduced income tax rates resulting from the strict means test policy also encourages higher average labour supply. The results for the shift to universal pension payments with the taper set to zero show the opposite behavioural effects, compared to those outlined above for the strict means test policy change.
The effects on average labour supply of the high taper rate policy are not only positive for young and middle age cohorts but also for older households aged 65 years and over, as shown in Figure   4b . Table 3 with the disaggregate effects on average labour supply for the 25 to 55 and 65 plus year olds shows that under the high taper policy change, many income types aged 65 years and over work longer hours, with average labour supply of 65 plus year olds up by 13.43 percent relative the benchmark. 13 While the labour supply of older households in the lowest quintile who receive the maximum pension regardless of the taper increases only marginally, the second, third and fourth quintiles at older ages experience significantly higher labour supply. Although the elderly in these quintiles work more to offset reduced pension payments, the labour supply effects differ among the three income groups. Specifically, households in the second quintile work and earn more but the EMTRs on their labour income are not affected by the increased taper because they do not exceed the maximum earnings exemption. The increase in average labour supply of 65 plus year olds in the third quintile is due to an increased retirement age. Note that these households work the same hours at early age pension ages as in the benchmark, in order to avoid high EMTRs on their earnings that they would pay if their labour earnings exceeded the maximum exemption. Finally, households in the fourth quintile no longer qualify for any pension at early age pension ages as a result of the increased taper. They no longer face any labour supply distortions arising from the means testing and, therefore, increase their labour supply and work similar hours as the highest income type of households. 14 In our small open economy framework, the capital labour ratio as well as the marginal products of capital and labour and the wage rate faced by the firms are all determined by the exogenously given and constant interest rate in the long run. To keep the capital labour ratio unchanged in the long run, the percentage changes in the per capita labour supply have to be matched by the percentage changes in the capital stock. The long run changes in average labour supply also determine the percentage changes in the output per capita because of the constant return to scale property of the production function. class and the remaining 10 percent in the high income class. Therefore, the positive labour supply effects that they found for the means test removal were to some extent a result of increased working hours of middle income households eligible for the pension. Recall that in Table 3 , we also show positive labour supply effects of the means test removal (i.e., Taper=0) for the 65-plus-year-olds in third and fourth quintiles, but these two income types together only account for 40 percent of population in that age group.
Changes to labour earnings exemptions
Here we discuss the long run simulation results for the hypothetical changes in the labour earnings (LE) exemptions from the means testing to 100 percent and to 0 percent. The main objective is to examine the effects of a preferential treatment of labour earnings in the income test of the age pension on labour supply of older Australians. Figure 5 compares the life-cycle labour supply in the benchmark averaged over five income types of households with the average labour supply profiles obtained from the two policy changes. The differences among the three profiles are significant for older households aged 65 years and over. While the hypothetical removal of the current labour earnings exemptions reduces labour supply at older ages, the 100 percent exemption of labour earnings from the means testing increases average labour supply of older households in comparison with the benchmark labour supply. Under the 100 percent labour earnings exemptions, the increased labour supply of older households is also shown to decline gradually with age. This is because elderly households in the third and fourth quintiles no longer face high EMTRs on their labour income as they did in the benchmark case. Recall that in the benchmark with the current labour earnings exemption, the working hours of the two-income types drop suddenly at early age pension ages (see the life-cycle labour supply in Figure 1 for the two quintiles).
FIGURE 5: Long Run Labour Supply Effects of Changes in LE Exemptions
Notes: The results relate to average labour supply over five income types of households.
The long run macroeconomic effects of the two policy changes in labour earnings exemptions are provided in Table 5 . Compared to the examined taper rate changes, the changes in labour earnings exemptions have much smaller aggregate effects, which are due to the assumed low and declining productivity at older ages, and relatively smaller numbers of people affected.
Importantly, labour earnings exemptions from the means testing have significant and positive effects on average labour supply of older Australians. The results for the 100 percent labour earnings exemptions show a 24.64 percent long run increase in average labour supply of households aged 65 years and older, which is almost a double of the long run increase in labour supply of the elderly resulted from the strict means test policy with the taper increased to one. Table 5 also shows increased age pension expenditures as a result of the 100 percent labour earnings exemptions, which calls for higher income tax rates assumed to maintain a balanced government budget. Higher income tax rates together with increased pension payments lead to smaller assets accumulations. As mentioned, the magnitude of these aggregate effects is much smaller relative to the macroeconomic implications of the taper rate changes (see Table 4 for comparison).
Transitional implications
The long run simulation results established that only the changes in the taper rate had significant effects on the Australian economy. In this subsection, we therefore focus on transitional implications of the taper rate changes for the key macroeconomic variables and welfare of different households.
Macroeconomic Effects
The macroeconomic effects of the taper rate changes on labour supply, domestic assets and consumption (all measured in per capita terms) upon the impact in 2012 and over the transition are depicted by Figure 6 . These effects are presented as percentage changes in the selected variables relative to their benchmark steady state values, with the results for year 2070 approximating the long run effects presented above.
FIGURE 6: Macroeconomic Effects of Taper Rate Changes over Transition
Several observations can be drawn from Figure 6 . First, the examined increases in the taper from the benchmark rate of 0.5 (combined with the budget-equilibrating reductions in income tax rates) generate higher per capita labour supply, assets and consumptions during the transition.
Second, the short run effects on per capital labour supply are larger than the long run implications as current middle age and older cohorts work more to offset large cuts in their pensions. The transitional decreases in per capita labour supply relative to the impact effect are due to greater assets accumulations by future born generations, which have an income effect on their labour supply. Nevertheless, the strict means test policy with the taper increased to one still generate a more than 0.8 percent long-run increase in per capita labour supply. Third, the effects of the two examined reductions in the taper rate are almost symmetrically opposite to the higher taper rate changes. For example, the shift to universal pension payments with the taper set to zero is shown to reduce per capita labour supply more in the short run than in the long run. Older households significantly reduce their working hours because of receiving higher (full) pensions, while future born generations accumulate smaller assets due to increased income tax rates. As a result, per capita labour supply improves but per capita consumption worsens in the subsequent years of the transition.
The transitional effects of the taper rate changes on the age pension expenditures and the budgetequilibrating income tax rates (not presented) are similar to the long run effects (see Table 4 ).
Specifically, the zero taper policy change increases the age pension expenditures by 41.66 percent upon the impact and in the long run as we assume stationary demographics. The examined increases in the income taper reduce the pension expenditures significantly in the short run, allowing for an immediate income tax cut. Over time, the pension expenditures (and thus income tax rates) decline further because future generations accumulate larger assets that generate higher assets income assessed under the income test of the age pension.
Welfare effects
The welfare effects are assessed on the basis of standard equivalent variations. Following
Nishiyama and Smetters (2007), we calculate the change in initial wealth/assets for each generation needed in the benchmark to produce remaining lifetime utility obtained under the policy change. The average welfare effects of the examined policy change (i.e., average welfare across the five income groups) as a function of cohort's age at the time of the policy change are plotted in Figure 7 . Recall that each hypothetical change is assumed to be adopted in 2012, with the cohort aged 21 years being the youngest alive at the time of the policy implementation. This generation would gain almost $50,000 in initial resources under the zero taper policy, whereas the same cohort loses, on average, almost $24,000 in the case of the taper increased to one. In the long run, however, the average welfare is shown to increase by over $10,000 for the increased taper policy and to decline by about $15,000 as a result of the zero taper policy. One should also note that current young and future generations who gain from the increased taper are larger in size compared to currently old generations.
The average welfare effects of the taper rate changes are further decomposed in Table 6 , which shows both the intergenerational implications for the selected cohorts and the intragenerational implications for each income quintile. The effects are presented as equivalent variations of onetime wealth transfers and are shown to be greater for higher income quintiles as they hold much larger lifetime wealth compared to lower income types. In fact, the welfare of households in the lowest quintile is affected only indirectly through the budget-equilibrating changes in income tax rates as these households eligible for the pension receive the maximum payment regardless of the taper. The welfare implications for higher income quintiles are also affected by direct effects of the changes in their current or future pension payments. 
Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of long run macroeconomic and welfare results obtained from the taper rate changes to several modifications of the model. The first modification assumes an alternative policy instrument to balance the government budget, while the second alteration allows for the domestic interest rate to be endogenous. In the third modification, we examine the long run effects of the taper rate changes in an ageing environment. Table 7 reports the percentage point deviations between the taper rate changes obtained under each alternative model assumption and those obtained using the baseline model re-ported above for selected macroeconomic variables and welfare measures, respectively. 
Consumption tax balancing budget
We have so far assumed proportional changes in the income tax schedule to balance the government budget. In this variation of the model, the income tax schedule is assumed to be unchanged and the government budget is balanced by adjustments made to the consumption tax rate, as assumed by Kudrna and Woodland (2011a) and Fehr and Uhde (2014) . The motivation for this robustness check is that the two tax instruments have potentially different incentive effects upon households and, hence, upon the economy.
The two examined increases (reductions) in the pension taper rate allows for (requires) a lower (higher) consumption tax rate, as shown in Table 7 . The percentage changes in the consumption tax rate are significantly greater than in the income tax rates (see Table 4 for comparison)
because of much smaller revenues generated by consumption taxes. More importantly, given that taxing consumption is less distortive for household behaviour than income taxation, tightening the taper with a reduced consumption tax rate has relatively negative long run effects on the selected macroeconomic variables. For instance, using the consumption tax rate rather than the income taxation to balance the government budget, the policy change of the taper increased to one reduces the long run increases in per capita labour supply and domestic assets by 0.3 and 3.92 percentage points, respectively.
The two tax policy instruments have also different effects on welfare of low and high income households, which in Table 7 are depicted by the effects on the lowest and highest income quintiles. In particular, increasing the taper with a reduced consumption tax rate improves (worsens) welfare of the lowest (highest) income quintile, whereas the opposite is shown for the examined taper reductions. Note that consumption taxes are regressive and income taxes are progressive. Hence, a reduction in the consumption tax rate has stronger positive welfare effects on low income households than on high income households who benefit more from an income tax cut with reduced marginal income tax rates.
endogenous interest rate setup such as the one applied in this section provides an additional support for the means testing of pension pensions.
Population ageing
Our sensitivity analysis of the baseline results to population ageing makes use of the medium population projections by Productivity Commission (2013). In particular, we use their agespecific survival rates in 2060 and calculate the annual rate of population growth to generate an old-age dependency ratio of 0.42 taken from their projections for 2060. The long run steady state effects of the taper rate changes in this ageing environment (with improved survival rates and lower population growth) are then compared with the baseline effects in Section 4.
The results in Table 7 indicate that both the reported macroeconomic aggregates and welfare increase more in this ageing environment than in the baseline model with existing demographics.
For instance, domestic assets per capita and average welfare across the income quintiles are 5.69
and 0.51 percentage points higher, respectively, in the long run.
The logic behind the results in Table 7 for the changes in the pension taper rate in an ageing economy is as follows. Population ageing with an increasing proportion of the elderly in the population results in higher pension expenditures, which need to be financed with higher taxes.
Strengthening the means testing of the age pension limits the increases in pension expenditures and income taxes. This is partly due to the increased taper rate but also to the means testing of larger assets and assets income. Notice that households respond to increased longevity and improved survival probabilities by accumulating larger assets, which generate higher assets income assessed under the means test. Therefore, the percentage decline in the required tax rates in an ageing environment is greater than that reported in the previous section with the current demographic structure. This explains positive effects of the means testing on the economy and welfare in an ageing economy when compared with the effects in a non-ageing environment. 16 
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Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have examined the implications of the means testing of Australia's age pension for life-cycle labour supply and assets, macroeconomic aggregates and household welfare. We base our analysis on a computable OLG model with the capacity to investigate policy changes in the taper rate at which the pension is withdrawn and in labour earnings exemptions from the means testing.
On the basis of our simulations of strengthening the pension means test via raising the taper, we show higher per capita labour supply, assets, consumption and long-term welfare gains.
Interestingly, tightening the taper increases labour supply of not only young and future generations, but also generations at early age pension ages. These positive effects of the means testing are due partly to reduced public pension payments (and associated disincentives to work and save) and partly to lower income taxes assumed to balance the government budget with reduced pension expenditures. Similarly to Fehr and Uhde (2014), we find significant welfare losses attained by many currently older generations who have their pension payments reduced as a result of increasing the taper. Note that these short run welfare losses could be minimised by implementing such policy change gradually over the next few decades to allow households to have enough time to adjust their behaviour.
We also show that while relaxing the means test for income earned from employment has little aggregate impact (including implications for government pension expenditures), the policy change has important and largely positive effects on labour supply at older ages.
Our findings have important policy implications not only for Australia but also for other ageing economies facing large future pension liabilities. Strengthening the means test generates significant reductions in overall government spending on the pension. Therefore, the policy could be used as an alternative (with potentially more equitable distributional implications) to increasing the pension access age that was recently proposed by the Australian government. 
